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Saccenti

PRETRIAL RELEASE & DETENTION IN MARYLAND AFTER THE 2017
AMENDMENTS TO THE PRETRIAL RELEASE RULES
Brian Saccenti*
INTRODUCTION
From October 2016 to February 2017, the criminal law
subcommittee of Maryland’s Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure, the Standing Committee itself, and then the Court of
Appeals of Maryland were presented with extensive evidence of the
harm done by the criminal justice system’s frequent use of unaffordable
money bail as a condition of release for arrestees. Pursuant to its rulemaking authority,1 the Court of Appeals dramatically revised the
procedural rules governing pretrial release and detention.2
The impetus for the 2017 amendments was concern, expressed
by Maryland’s Attorney General and others, that the practice of
imposing unaffordable money bail that results in pretrial detention is
unconstitutional and unjust.3 Accordingly, the most significant changes
to the rules were to (a) prohibit courts from imposing financial
conditions (referred to in the rule as a “special condition of release with
financial terms”4) that result in the pretrial detention of the defendant,5
and (b) expressly require courts to give priority to nonfinancial
conditions of release (especially unsecured bonds).6 Other changes
include:

© 2018 Brian Saccenti
* Chief Attorney, Appellate Division, Maryland Office of the Public Defender. The
author thanks Mary-Denise Davis and Ethan Frenchman for their helpful feedback.
1
See MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18(a) (providing in pertinent part that “[t]he Court of
Appeals from time to time shall adopt rules and regulations concerning the practice
and procedure in and the administration of the appellate courts and in the other
courts of this State, which shall have the force of law until rescinded, changed or
modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law.”).
2
Court of Appeals, Rules Order to Adopt Proposed New Rule 4-216.1 and
Amendments to Current Rules (Feb. 16, 2017),
http://www.courts.state.md.us/rules/rodocs/ro192.pdf [hereinafter Rules Order].
3
See STANDING COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. & PROC., 192D. REPORT TO THE COURT
OF APPEALS at 2–3 (2016) [hereinafter 192d Report].
4
MD. R. 4-216.1(e)(1)(A). Unless otherwise specified, all references to Rule 4-216
are to the version that took effect July 1, 2017.
5
See id.
6
See MD. R. 4-216.1(b) & (d)(2)(N) advisory committee’s note.
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• A prohibition on using money bail to ameliorate
dangerousness;7
• A requirement that the court consider “the recommendation of
any pretrial release services program that has made a risk
assessment of the defendant in accordance with a validated risk
assessment tool and is willing to provide an acceptable level of
supervision over the defendant during the period of release if so
directed by the judicial officer”8 – a provision evidently
designed to account for and encourage the development of
pretrial services programs and the use of validated risk
assessments; and
• An expanded list of conditions of release.9
These changes took effect July 1, 2017.10 The purpose of this
article is to assist judges, commissioners, prosecutors, and defense
counsel as they figure out how to apply the revised rules. Part I of this
article discusses the concerns about the money bail system that led to
the changes.11 Part II discusses general principles applicable to pretrial
release determinations that were not changed by the rule amendments,
but which guide their implementation at pretrial release hearings.12 Part
III discusses the changes made by the 2017 amendments to the rules.13
I. THE IMPETUS FOR THE AMENDMENTS
Although concerns about Maryland’s pretrial release system are not
new,14 the reform effort started gaining unprecedented momentum in
See MD. R. 4-216.1(e)(1)(B) (providing in pertinent part that “[s]pecial conditions
of release with financial terms are appropriate only to ensure the appearance of the
defendant and may not be imposed solely to prevent future criminal conduct during
the pretrial period or to protect the safety of any person or the community.”).
8
MD. R. 4-216.1(f)(1).
9
See MD. R. 4-216.1(f)(2).
10
See Rules Order, supra note 2, at 3.
11
See infra Part I.
12
See infra Part II.
13
See infra Part III.
14
Executive, judicial, and independent agencies have all published reports on
Maryland’s pretrial release system in the last fifteen years. See ABELL FOUND., THE
PRETRIAL RELEASE PROJECT: A STUDY OF MARYLAND’S PRETRIAL RELEASE AND
BAIL SYSTEM (2001),
http://www.abell.org/sites/default/files/publications/hhs_pretrial_9.01%281%29.pdf
7
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the fall of 2016.15 The impetus for the changes proposed by the Rules
Committee was an October 11, 2016, advice letter from the Office of
the Attorney General to five members of the General Assembly.16 That
letter opined that:
• “the Court of Appeals would conclude that the State's statutory
law and court rules should be applied to require a judicial officer
to conduct an individualized inquiry into a criminal defendant's
ability to pay a financial condition of pretrial release”;
• “in the event a judicial officer determines that pretrial detention
is not justified to meet the State's regulatory goals, a judicial
officer may not impose a financial condition set solely to detain
the defendant”;
• “setting the bail in an amount not affordable to the defendant,
thus effectively denying release, raises a significant risk that the
Court of Appeals would find it violates due process”; and
• “[i]f pretrial detention is not justified yet bail is set out of reach
financially for the defendant, it is also likely the Court would
declare that the bail is excessive under the Eighth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution and Article 25 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights.”17

(analyzing the pretrial release system at the behest of the Maryland State Bar
Association); JUSTICE POLICY INST., BALTIMORE BEHIND BARS: HOW TO REDUCE
THE JAIL POPULATION, SAVE MONEY AND IMPROVE PUBLIC SAFETY (2010),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/10-06_rep_baltbehindbars_md-ps-acrd.pdf.; MD. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SEV. OFF. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS, TASK FORCE TO STUDY
THE LAWS AND POLICIES RELATING TO REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENT CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS BY THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER (2013),
http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc5300/sc5339/000113/018000/0189
24/unrestricted/20140000e.pdf; GOVERNOR’S COMM’N TO REFORM MARYLAND’S
PRETRIAL SYSTEM, FINAL REPORT (2014),
http://goccp.maryland.gov/pretrial/documents/2014-pretrial-commission-finalreport.pdf [hereinafter Governor’s Comm’n.].
15
Editorial, Unconstitutional Detention, BALT. SUN (Oct. 13, 2016),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-affordable-bail20161013-story.html.
16
See 192d Report, supra note 3, at 2–3.
17
Letter from Sandra Benson Brantley, Counsel to the Gen. Assembly, Off. of the
Attn’y Gen., to the Hon. Erek L. Barron, et al. 1–2 (Oct. 11, 2016),
http://www.opd.state.md.us/Portals/0/Downloads/bail%20letter%20advice%201011-16.pdf.
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Two weeks later, Maryland’s Attorney General urged the Rules
Committee to recommend amendments to the Maryland Rules to
expressly clarify that where the judicial officer determines,
based on all applicable criteria, that bail is the least onerous
condition necessary to ensure the defendant’s appearance or to
protect public safety, that officer must conduct an individualized
inquiry into the defendant's financial circumstances and may not
set bail that exceeds the defendant's means for the purpose of
detaining the defendant.18
The Rules Committee began considering proposed amendments
a short time later.19
Among the materials submitted by the Rules Committee was a
memorandum by former United States Attorney General Eric Holder
and colleagues at the law firm of Covington & Burling to the Maryland
Attorney General.20 The memorandum analyzed “the wealth-based
nature of Maryland’s pretrial detention scheme,” and explained why it
was illegal, “ripe for attack on both state law and federal constitutional
grounds,” “irrational, unjust, and inefficient.”21 The memorandum
concluded by recommending several changes that the judiciary “could
initiate to improve the disturbing status quo in Maryland’s pretrial
detention practices,” including:
• a judicial resolution or rule change requiring that judicial
officers refrain from imposing pretrial financial conditions that
result in pretrial detention;

Letter from Brian E. Frosh, Md. Attn’y Gen., to the Hon. Alan M. Wilner, Chair,
Standing Comm. on Rules of Prac. and Proc. 1–2 (Oct. 25, 2016),
http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/News%20Documents/Rules_Committee_L
etter_on_Pretrial_Release.pdf.
19
After the Criminal Rules Subcommittee met and forwarded proposed amendments,
the full Rules Committee considered them at a meeting on Nov. 18, 2016. See 192d
Report, supra note 3 at 3.
20
Memorandum from Eric H. Holder Jr., Former U.S. Attn’y Gen., to Brian E,
Frosh, Md. Attn’y Gen. (Oct. 3, 2016),
http://www.opd.state.md.us/Portals/0/Downloads/Covington%20white%20paper%2
0Maryland%20Wealth-Based%20Pretrial%20Detention%20Scheme.pdf.
21
Id. at 1.
18
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• education of judicial officers on the efficacy and availability
of alternatives to secured bail;
• tracking data at commissioner and bail review hearings to
better understand and address troubling disparities; and
• operating automated court date reminder services that have
been proven to increase defendants’ appearances in court.22
Around this time, the Office of the Public Defender issued a
report entitled THE HIGH COST OF BAIL: HOW MARYLAND’S RELIANCE
ON MONEY BAIL JAILS THE POOR AND COSTS THE COMMUNITY
MILLIONS.23 That report analyzed more than 700,000 criminal (nontraffic) cases filed in the District Court of Maryland in eighteen
jurisdictions from 2011 to 2015.24 It found:
1. Maryland’s reliance on money bail causes the routine, illegal
incarceration of poor people: over a five-year period, no fewer
than 46,597 defendants were detained on bail for more than five
days at the start of their criminal case. Of these, more than
17,434 defendants were detained on bail amounts of less than
$5,000.
2. For those who go to a bondsman, the price is steep. Maryland
communities were charged more than $256 million in nonrefundable corporate bail bond premiums from 2011 to 2015.
3. Defendants who use a bail bondsman are obligated to pay a
corporate bail bond premium regardless of the outcome of the
case. More than $75 million in bail bond premiums were
charged in cases that were resolved without any finding of
wrongdoing.
4. Corporate bonds extract tens of millions of dollars from
Maryland’s poorest zip codes, contributing to the perpetuation
of poverty.
5. The money bail system has a disproportionate impact on
racial minorities: over five years, black defendants were charged
22

Id. at 1–2.
Arpit Gupta, et al., THE HIGH COST OF BAIL: HOW MARYLAND’S RELIANCE ON
MONEY BAIL JAILS THE POOR AND COSTS THE COMMUNITY MILLIONS (2016),
http://www.opd.state.md.us/Portals/0/Downloads/High%20Cost%20of%20Bail.pdf.
24
See id. at 4 (explaining that the report focused on criminal cases filed in the
District Court of Maryland from 2011 to 2015).
23
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premiums of at least $181 million, while defendants of all other
races combined were charged $75 million.
6. For all these costs, secured money bail that requires a payment
for release is no more effective than unsecured bonds, for which
defendants pay nothing unless they fail to appear for court.25
In its report, the Rules Committee summarized the problems as
follows:
There have been several independent, highly credible studies of
the pre-trial release system in Maryland. Each of them has
found, from documented evidence, that the reliance on money
bail set at levels that the defendant cannot afford is (1) not
uncommon, (2) irrational, unfair, unnecessary to ensure either
the defendant’s appearance or public safety, (3) racially and
ethnically discriminatory, and (4) fiscally unsound. These
studies stress not only the fiscal cost to the State and the counties
from incarcerating people who do not need to be incarcerated
but also the human cost of incarceration – the loss of
employment; the loss of housing, automobiles, and utilities and
other services because of the loss of income; the loss of
governmental benefits, such as Medicaid and Social Security
SSI payments; the disruption of families – all of which can have
a lasting and devastating impact on the defendant and his or her
family.26
Merely listing the policy concerns that led to the rule changes
risks missing the forest for the trees. Fundamentally, the effort was
about making our system better and fairer. The Chief Judge of the
District Court put it well in his testimony to the Court of Appeals:
The point of this rule is what . . . my father would remind me of,
and that’s, “Can we do it better?” Can the current rule be
modified so that we can have a more systematic way of
performing bond reviews that go to some of the very valid
concerns that the Attorney General raised in his advice letter?
. . .

25
26

Id.
192d Report, supra note 3, at 3–4.
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[T]here’s an adage that I draw on. And I’ve heard President
Kennedy refer to it, and President Obama refer to it, and it
actually hails back to a Jewish leader from around the beginning
of the common era named Hillel. And it’s, “If not me, then who?
If not now, then when? And if not here, then where?” . . . And I
respectfully suggest to this Court that when you’re deciding on
this rule, if you apply that adage, that the answers should be,
“This Court, this courtroom, and today.”27
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The amendments did not disturb the primary constitutional and
legal principles applicable to pretrial release and detention decisions.
Those are outlined below, as they provide the context for the rule
changes discussed in Part III.
A. Pretrial liberty is the norm; detention is the limited exception
The idea that “liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial . .
. is the carefully limited exception” is the bedrock principle that guides
pretrial release decisions. 28 As the Court of Special Appeals has
reiterated, “[a]n individual's ‘interest in liberty’ is of a ‘fundamental
nature,’ . . . and at liberty’s core is the right to be free from arbitrary
confinement by bodily restraint.”29 Consistent with these constitutional
requirements, the amended rules adopt a preference for pretrial release
by providing:
(I) Construction.
(A) This Rule is designed to promote the release of defendants
on their own recognizance or, when necessary, unsecured bond.
Additional conditions should be imposed on release only if the
need to ensure appearance at court proceedings, to protect the
community, victims, witnesses, or any other person and to
27

Open Meeting of the Court of Appeals to Consider the One Hundred NinetySecond Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Part
3), COURT OF APPEALS, 12:34–12:53 & 14:46–15:25 (Jan. 5, 2017),
http://www.courts.state.md.us/coappeals/media/2017openmtgs/20170105rulesmtgpt
3.mp4.
28
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
29
Wheeler v. State, 864 A.2d 1058, 1062 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005) (internal
citations omitted).
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maintain the integrity of the judicial process is demonstrated by
the circumstances of the individual case. Preference should be
given to additional conditions without financial terms.
(B) This Rule shall be construed to permit the release of a
defendant pending trial except upon a finding by the judicial
officer that, if the defendant is released, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the defendant (i) will not appear when required,
or (ii) will be a danger to an alleged victim, another person, or
the community. If such a finding is made, the defendant shall
not be released.30
B. Standards and burdens of proof
The standards and burdens of proof applicable to pretrial release
determinations vary depending on the basis for restricting release
(dangerousness vs. flight risk) and whether CP § 5-202 applies.31
1. Dangerousness
Detention based on dangerousness is sometimes referred to as
“preventative detention.”32 The Supreme Court has taken a restrictive
approach, and has “upheld preventative detention based on
dangerousness only when limited to specially dangerous individuals
and subject to strong procedural protections.’”33
Accordingly, the Court of Special Appeals in Wheeler v. State
considered the due process requirements for pretrial detention and held
that “‘preventive detention’ may be ordered pursuant to Md. Rule 4216, provided that the judicial officer is persuaded by clear and
convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions of
pretrial release can reasonably protect against the danger that the
defendant presents to an identifiable potential victim and/or to the
community.”34
30

MD. R. 4-216.1(b)(1).
See Lauryn P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016
BYU L. REV. 837, 873 (2016).
32
Jeffrey Fagan & Martin Guggenheim, Preventive Detention and the Judicial
Prediction of Dangerous for Juveniles: A Natural Experiment, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 415, 415 (1996).
33
Wheeler, 864 A.2d at 1062 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91
(2001).
34
Id.
31
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Put another way:
‘preventive detention’ may not be ordered unless the judicial
officer is persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that no
condition or combination of conditions of pretrial release can
reasonably protect against the danger that the defendant poses to
the safety of an identifiable person or to the community at
large.35
This language indicates that the burden of proof is on the party
seeking the detention, i.e., the State.
2. Flight risk
At present, no Maryland case, statute, or rule establishes the
standard of proof applicable when the State seeks to detain someone
based on risk of non-appearance.
The Federal Bail Reform Act requires clear and convincing
evidence for detention based on dangerousness, but is silent as to the
burden of proof for detention based on risk of nonappearance.36 In the
absence of a clear standard of the “government’s burden of proof for a
flight risk, several courts have agreed that it is a preponderance of the
evidence.”37
A case can be made, however, that the standard of proof for
detention based on flight risk ought to be the same as the standard for
detention based on dangerous, i.e., proof by clear and convincing
evidence. As the Wheeler Court explained, “[i]n cases involving
individual rights, whether criminal or civil, [t]he standard of proof [at a
minimum] reflects the value society places on individual liberty.’
‘[L]iberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial . . . is the carefully
limited exception.’”38
If standards of proof for detention are based on the impact of
detention on the liberty interest of the individual, it makes little sense to
use a lower standard of proof when the reason for detention is risk of
35

Id. at 1065.
18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B).
37
Gouldin, supra note 31, at 873 n.159.
38
Id.; Wheeler, 864 A.2d. at 1065.
36
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nonappearance instead of dangerousness. Perhaps for this reason, the
American Bar Association’s Standards for Criminal Justice provide that
clear and convincing evidence should be the standard for both
dangerousness and flight risk.39 The commentary explains, “The ‘clear
and convincing evidence’ criterion is a stringent one, and is intended to
emphasize that secure detention should be used only when facts show
that it is necessary to prevent flight or assure the safety of the
community.”40
3. Rebuttable presumption created by Criminal Procedure
Article (CP) § 5-202
Maryland’s Criminal Procedure Article (CP) § 5-202 prohibits
court commissioners from releasing certain categories of defendants,
but permits judges to do so.41 For five of these categories,42 the statute
creates “a rebuttable presumption” that such a defendant “will flee and
pose a danger to another person or the community.”43
Construing similar rebuttable presumptions in the Federal Bail
Reform Act, federal courts have held that such presumptions shift the
burden of production to the defendant, but the burden of persuasion –

39

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS: PRETRIAL RELEASE §10-5.10(f) (AM. BAR ASS'N 3d ed. 2007) (“In
pretrial detention proceedings, the prosecutor should bear the burden of establishing
by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions of
release will reasonably ensure the defendant’s appearance in court and protect the
safety of the community or any person.”).
40
See id. §10-5.10.
41
MD. CODE. ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 5-202(b)–(f) (West 2017).
42
These five categories are (1) defendants charged as drug kingpins, (2) defendants
charged with a crime of violence who have previously been convicted of a crime of
violence or certain firearm-related offenses, (3) defendants charged with committing
certain crimes while released on bail or personal recognizance for a pending prior
charge of committing one of those crimes, (4) defendants charged with certain
firearm-related crimes who have previously been convicted of one of those crimes or
a crime of violence, and (5) defendants who are registered sex offenders. See MD.
CODE. ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 5-202(b), (c), (d), (f) & (g). Note that the presumption
for the third category – defendants charged with committing certain crimes while
released on bail or personal recognizance for a pending prior charge of committing
one of those crimes – ceases to apply after the “final determination of the prior
charge.” Id. at § 5-202(d)(4).
43
MD. CODE. CRIM. PRO. ANN. § 5-202(b)(3), (c)(3), (d)(4), (f)(3) & (g)(3).
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the burden to justify pretrial detention – remains with the government.44
If a defendant proffers or presents evidence to rebut the presumption,
the court must determine whether detention is appropriate in light of
statutory factors similar to those listed in Maryland Rule 4-216.1(f),
giving due consideration to the statutory presumption as a factor
militating against release.45
C. The nature of the evidence or information at pretrial release
hearings
1. Rules of Evidence generally inapplicable
The evidentiary rules contained in Title 5 of the Maryland Rules,
other than those relating to the competency of witnesses, do not apply
to pretrial release proceedings under Rules 4–216, 4–216.1, 4–216.2 or
4–216.3.46 However, the suspension of Title 5 does not mean that courts
cannot hear evidence (as opposed to proffers) at bail review hearings.
Like other proceedings where Title 5 is inapplicable—such as
sentencing, suppression, and probation hearings—the suspension of
Title 5 should best be understood as a means of expanding the universe
of possible information for the court to consider without strict adherence
to the rules of evidence that would govern a trial.
2. Hearsay must be reasonably reliable
Because the Rules of Evidence do not apply at pretrial release
hearings, the court generally may consider hearsay evidence.47 Thus, it
is not uncommon for a court to consider a Statement of Probable Cause
or an Application for Statement of Charges, which themselves are

44

See, e.g., United States v. Hir, 517 F.3d 1081, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that the presumption shifts the
burden of production to the defendant, but the burden of burden belongs to the
government).
45
Hir, 517 F.3d at 1086.
46
MD. R. 5-101(b)(6).
47
While there is no definitive decision on the matter, many courts have upheld the
use of hearsay in preliminary hearings. See Christine Holst, The Confrontation
Clause and Pretrial Hearings: A Due Process Solution, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1599,
1611–12 (2010).
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hearsay and also often contain hearsay statements allegedly made by
witnesses.48
A defendant’s right to due process and the standard of proof,
however, prohibit a judge from detaining a person based on hearsay
unless there are indicia that the hearsay is reasonably reliable.49
Although Maryland’s appellate courts have not yet addressed this issue
in the context of pretrial release hearings, they have done so in the
context of other hearings where the rules of evidence do not apply, and
have held that courts could consider hearsay only if it was reasonably
reliable and probative.50
As the Federal Court for the District of Puerto Rico explained in
the context of a pretrial release hearing:
[T]he Court does not doubt that FBI agents were informed by a
confidential witness that defendant stated that he would “fuck”
certain persons upon his return from Cuba, nor, that defendant's
son stated that if Barletta were taken out of the picture there
would be no more case. What is at issue here, however, is not
the credibility of the special agents who have testified, but that
of the confidential witness(es), who were not present at the
detention hearing, hence not subject to cross-examination. It is
not ultimately necessary that the Government call its
confidential witnesses to testify at a detention hearing. See
United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir.
1985) (holding that hearsay testimony is admissible at detention
hearing). However, the (at times double) hearsay of the
confidential witnesses provided to the Court is generic and
perfunctory, quite conclusory, as well as unreliable to prove the
particular circumstances surrounding the event referred to. For
48

E-mail from Mary-Denise Davis, Chief Attorney, Baltimore Central Booking Unit,
Maryland Office of the Public Defender, to author (Sept. 13, 2017, 10:03 PM EST)
(hereinafter “MDD email”) (on file with author).
49
See State v. Fuller, 306 A.2d 1315, 1318 (Md. 1987) (explaining that admission of
hearsay in a probation revocation hearing may be allowed, but only after analysis of
the reliability).
50
See id.; see also In re Billy W., 875 A.2d 734, 751 (Md. 2005) (permanency plan
hearing); Baker v. State, 632 A.2d 783, 790 (Md. 1993) (sentencings); Brown v.
State, 564 A.2d 772, 777 (Md. 1989) (probation revocation hearings); In re Damien
F., 958 A.2d 402, 420 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (shelter care hearings); In re Delric
H., 819 A.2d 1117, 1126 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2003) (juvenile restitution hearings).
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example, the confidential witness had reason to believe that the
list of names from the computer was a “hit list”. No further
reasons, however, are provided to support this conclusion. Also,
Harold Rivera and defendant allegedly made statements in the
confidential witness' presence pertaining to witnesses and
government personnel. Other than such statements themselves,
the Government has not provided other details about the same,
which could provide an indicia of reliability of the hearsay.51
3.Nature of evidence and information presented about charged
crime
A judicial officer may properly consider the allegations in the
case at hand when deciding whether or on what conditions to release the
defendant.52 In Maryland, judges typically obtain this information from
(a) the Statement of Probable Cause or Application for Statement of
Charges filed by a police officer or complaining lay witness, and/or (b)
a proffer made by the prosecutor.53 Although rarely done, prosecutors
can also present live testimony or other exhibits at the hearing. In
general, the parties may present “any information” relevant to the
court’s determination of dangerousness or flight risk.54
4. Insufficient proffers
Prosecution proffers in support of detention may be insufficient.
Maryland’s federal court has explained the extent to which pretrial
detention based on prosecution proffers is appropriate, and recognized
that proffers may not always be enough:
[T]he case law supporting detention upon government proffers
in no way requires a judicial officer to accept or accredit
proffered evidence, nor does that case law assume that proffers
in lieu of live testimony are appropriate in every case. The case
51

See Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d at 208 (holding that hearsay testimony at detention
hearing must be sufficiently reliable).
52
See MD. R. 4-216.1(f)(2)(A) (providing that “the judicial officer shall consider,”
inter alia, “the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, [and] the nature of
the evidence against the defendant”).
53
See MDD email, supra note 48.
54
See MD. R. 4-216.1(f)(2)(F)–(G) (2017).
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law certainly does not limit, and in fact supports, the discretion
of the reviewing judicial officer to require the presentation of
evidence. Of necessity, the propriety of a proffer as a basis for
detention must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. When the
government is able to proffer evidence that reflects ample and
substantial corroboration for its contention that a defendant has
committed an offense and is dangerous or a flight risk,
efficiency and the need to conserve scarce judicial resources
justify accepting that proffer in lieu of live testimony; and such
proffers that are reflective of weighty and broad evidence of
guilt, when considered with other information such as criminal
history and lack of ties to the community, can be entirely proper
bases for orders of detention. On the other hand, when the
evidence proffered is the uncorroborated statement(s) of one or
two police officers who allegedly observed a single act
committed by the defendant, and when there is no other
evidence proffered in support of the eyewitness testimony, the
Court should consider the proffer with great care and accord it
limited weight. Before entering any order of detention in such a
case, the judicial officer should require the government to
present live testimony able to withstand confrontation, long- and
well-recognized as the “greatest legal engine ever invented for
the discovery of truth.”55
5. Courts are not required to accept the State’s allegations as
true.
Some judges and prosecutors continue to believe that the court
must accept the State’s allegations as true when making a pretrial
release/detention determination.56 This is incorrect, for the following
reasons:
• It is inconsistent with the authority that places a burden of
proof on the State when it seeks detention,57 and would convert
this burden of proof into a mere pleading requirement;
55

United States v. Hammond, 44 F. Supp. 2d 743, 746 (D. Md. 1999) (internal
citations omitted).
56
See MDD email, supra note 48.
57
See supra Part II.B.
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• It is inconsistent with Rule 4-216.1’s requirement that the court
consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense charged,
the nature of the evidence against the defendant,”58 and “any
information presented by the defendant or defendant's
attorney;”59 and
• It is inconsistent with the procedural protections that the Court
of Special Appeals has required in analogous hearings.60
6. Procedural protections at analogous hearings
Unlike the Federal Bail Reform Act,61 Maryland’s rules
governing pretrial release hearings do not describe in detail the
procedural rights of the accused. To fill in the gaps, courts should look
to the procedural protections required at analogous hearings.
One analogy is a shelter care hearing after a child is removed
from the physical custody of a parent or guardian “to determine whether
the temporary placement of the child outside of the home is
warranted.”62 Just as pretrial release hearings must be conducted
promptly after an arrest,63 a shelter care hearing ordinarily must be
conducted promptly after a local department of social services removes
the child from the parent’s or guardian’s custody and places him or her
in shelter care.64 The governmental interests at stake are of comparable
58

MD. R. 4-216.1(f)(2)(A).
MD. R. 4-216.1(f)(2)(G).
60
See infra Part II.C.6.
61
See infra Pt II.C.6; 18 U.S.C. §3142(f)(2) (2008 Supp.). This paragraph
provides in pertinent part: “At the [detention] hearing, such person has the
right to be represented by counsel, and, if financially unable to obtain
adequate representation, to have counsel appointed. The person shall be
afforded an opportunity to testify, to present witnesses, to cross-examine
witnesses who appear at the hearing, and to present information by proffer or
otherwise. The rules concerning admissibility of evidence in criminal trials do
not apply to the presentation and consideration of information at the hearing.
The facts the judicial officer uses to support a finding pursuant to subsection
(e) that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the
safety of any other person and the community shall be supported by clear and
convincing evidence.”
62
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §3-801(z) (2016 Supp.).
63
See MD. R. 4-212(e)-(f); MD. R. 4-216.2(a).
64
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS & JUD. PROC. §3-815(C)(2) (ii) (West 2017) (“Unless
extended on good cause shown, a shelter care hearing shall be held not later than
next day on which the circuit court is in session.”).
59
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importance.65 The severity of the potential deprivation is worse for the
arrestee in the pretrial release hearing than for the parent or guardian in
the shelter care hearing due to both its nature (incarceration versus
removal of a child from the home) and duration.66 As with pretrial
release hearings, the statute and rule governing shelter care hearings
said little about how they were to be conducted. As with pretrial release
hearings, the rules of evidence generally do not apply at shelter care
hearings.67
The case of In re Damien F.68 arose from two shelter care
hearings where the local department proceeded solely on proffers and
the circuit court denied the parent’s request to call witnesses.69 On
appeal, the Court of Special Appeals considered “whether the court [at
a shelter care hearing] was required to permit . . . the parents of the
sheltered children[] to present witnesses at that hearing to prove their
case and whether they had a right to cross-examine the Department's
witnesses to contradict its case.”70 Based on (1) the right of the parent
or guardian to be present at and participate in such hearings, (2) the
parent or guardian’s right to counsel at such a hearing, and (3) the
impossibility of resolving factual disputes raised by competing
proffers71 – factors that are equally applicable at pretrial release

65

See MD. R. 216.1(b)(1)(B) (showing that in pretrial release hearings, that interest
is reasonably ensuring public safety and the defendant’s appearance in court); see
also MD. CODE ANN., CTS & JUD. PROC. §3-815(d)(1) (West 2017) (finding in shelter
care hearings, it is in protecting the safety and welfare of the child).
66
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS & JUD. PROC. §3-815(c)(4) (West 2017) (“A court may
not order shelter care for more than 30 days except that shelter care may be extended
for up to an additional 30 days if the court finds after a hearing held as part of an
adjudication that continued shelter care is needed to provide for the safety of the
child.” The duration of pretrial detention, by contrast, is not expressly limited. There
are provisions requiring a speedy trial, but these often permit delays of much more
than 30 or 60 days. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 6-103 (West 2017)
(creating a window of up to 180 days); MD. R. 4-271(a)(1) (providing that “[t]he
date for trial in the circuit court shall be set within 30 days after the earlier of the
appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the circuit
court pursuant to Rule 4-213, and shall be not later than 180 days after the earlier of
those events,” but allowing exceptions and extensions for good cause).
67
See MD. R. 4-216(h); MD. R. 5-101(b)(6)–(11) (2017); MD. R. 11-112(d).
68
958 A.2d 402 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008).
69
Id. at 411.
70
Id. at 414.
71
Id. at 412, 415–19.
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hearings72 – the Court held that the juvenile court’s blanket refusal to
allow the parent to cross-examine the department’s witnesses or present
witnesses was an abuse of discretion.73 It then “set forth the following
procedures to facilitate resolving the ‘conflicting proffers’ in an
efficacious manner:”74
When presented with a request by counsel for the parent or
parents to be allowed to present witnesses at a shelter care
hearing, as a threshold matter, the court should ask counsel to
denote the allegations asserted to be in dispute. The judge should
make an initial determination as to whether the competing
versions of behavior or events, viz a viz, the proffered testimony
versus the allegations in the petition, are in dispute. We hold
that, unless the disputed allegation is probatively
inconsequential to a determination of whether placement is
required to protect a child from serious immediate danger or that
removal from the home is necessary to provide for the safety and
welfare of the child, the court must receive testimony as to the
material, disputed allegations and a denial of the request to
produce witnesses, in that instance, is an abuse of discretion.75
Another analogous proceeding is a probation or parole
revocation hearing. In contrast to a presumptively innocent pretrial
72

For right to be present and participate, see MD. R. 4-212(e)&(f) (providing that
“[t]he defendant shall be taken before a judicial officer” for the initial pretrial release
determination); MD. R. 4-216.1(f)(2)(G) (requiring judicial officer to consider “any
information presented by the defendant or defendant’s attorney”); MD. R 4-216.2(a)
(providing that “[a] defendant who is denied pretrial release by a commissioner or
who for any reason remains in custody after a commissioner has determined
conditions of release pursuant to Rule 4-216 shall be presented immediately to the
District Court if the court is then in session, or if not, at the next session of the
court”). For the right to counsel, see DeWolfe v. Richmond, 76 A.3d 1019, 1031
(Md. 2013) (discussing initial hearings before court commissioners); see also MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-204(b)(2) (West 2012) (describing pretrial release
hearing before judge); MD. R. 4-216.2(b) (discussing bail reviews). As to the
problem of reconciling competing proffers, the Court of Special Appeals noted that
this problem exists regardless of whether the underlying cases is criminal or civil in
nature. In re Damien F., 958 A.2d 417–19 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008).
73
In re Damien F., 958 A.2d at 422–23.
74
Id. at 424.
75
Id.
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arrestee, a probationer or parolee has a diminished liberty interest, as
“[r]evocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which
every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly
dependent on observance of special parole [or probation] restrictions.”76
The Supreme Court has held that a parolee or probationer accused of
violating parole or probation is entitled under the Due Process Clause 77
“to two hearings, one a preliminary hearing at the time of his arrest and
detention to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that
he has committed a violation of his parole [or probation], and the other
a somewhat more comprehensive hearing prior to the making of the
final revocation decision.”78 It explained the procedural protections
required in these hearings:
At the preliminary hearing, a probationer or parolee is entitled
to notice of the alleged violations of probation or parole, an
opportunity to appear and to present evidence in his own behalf,
a conditional right to confront adverse witnesses, an
independent decision maker, and a written report of the hearing.
The final hearing is a less summary one because the decision
under consideration is the ultimate decision to revoke rather than
a mere determination of probable cause, but the “minimum
requirements of due process” include very similar elements:
“(a) written notice of the claimed violations of
(probation or) parole; (b) disclosure to the (probationer
or) parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to
be heard in person and to present witnesses and
documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing
officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body
such as a traditional parole board, members of which
need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written

76

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ( “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law”).
78
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781–82 (1973).
77
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statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on
and reasons for revoking (probation or) parole.”79
If a parent facing the temporary loss of custody of a child at a
shelter care hearing has a conditional right to cross-examine the
witnesses whose statements are being used against her and to present
testimonial evidence,80 then so should a defendant at a pretrial release
hearing where she faces the possibility of being incarcerated for far
longer. If a parolee or probationer facing loss of his conditional liberty
has a right “to present evidence in his own behalf” and “a conditional
right to confront adverse witnesses,”81 then so should a presumptively
innocent arrestee when facing a deprivation of “the absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled.”82
III. THE 2017 CHANGES
The 2017 changes rewrote Rule 4-216.1 and amended several
rules, most notably Rules 4-216 and 4-216.2.83 What follows is a
summary of the main changes.
A. Expanded list of non-financial conditions of release
Consistent with its aim to reduce the use of money bail, the
amendments expanded the list of non-financial conditions of release.
First, they embraced the option of unsecured bonds.84 An
unsecured bond is “a written obligation of the person signing the bond
conditioned on the appearance of the defendant and providing for the
payment of a penalty sum according to its terms”85 without the
requirement of “collateral security” (i.e. “property deposited, pledged,
or encumbered to secure the performance of a bond”).”86 Unlike a
79

Id. at 786 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)) (internal
citation omitted).
80
See supra text accompanying notes 62–77.
81
Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972))
(internal citation omitted).
82
Id. at 781 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
83
See Rules Order, supra note 2.
84
See MD. R. 4-216.1(b)(1)(A), (b)(3), (c)(1).
85
MD. R. 4-216.1(a)(2).
86
MD. R. 4-216.1(a)(3).
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secured bond, which typically requires a defendant and/or his family or
friends to (a) deposit some or all of the penalty sum with the clerk of
the court, (b) encumber real or personal property with a value equal to
some or all of the penalty sum, or (c) pay a non-refundable fee to a
“compensated surety” (typically a bail bond company), which then
executes the bond, an unsecured bond merely requires the defendant
(or, if specified by the judicial officer, the defendant and a friend or
family member)87 to agree in writing to pay a penalty sum if the
defendant fails to appear as required. An unsecured bond does not
require the defendant or his friends or family to deposit money with the
court, or pay a fee to a bondsman.88
Second, the amendments added more non-financial conditions
of release. These are:
• one or more of the conditions authorized under Code, Criminal
Law Article, §9-304 reasonably necessary to stop or prevent the
intimidation of a victim or witness or a violation of Code,
Criminal Law Article, §§ 9-302, 9-303, or 9-305, including a
general no-contact order;
• reasonable restrictions with respect to travel, association, and
place of residence;
• a requirement that the defendant maintain employment or, if
unemployed, actively seek employment;
• a requirement that the defendant maintain or commence an
educational program;
• a reasonable curfew, taking into account the defendant’s
employment, educational, or other lawful commitments;
• a requirement that the defendant refrain from possessing a
firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapon;
• a requirement that the defendant refrain from excessive use of
alcohol or use or possession of a narcotic drug or other
controlled dangerous substance, as defined in Code, Criminal

87

See MD. R. 4-216.1(d)(2)(L) (authorizing the judicial officer to require, as a
condition of release, the “execution of unsecured bonds by the defendant and an
uncompensated surety who (i) has a verifiable and lawful personal relationship with
the defendant, (ii) is acceptable to the judicial officer, and (iii) is willing to execute
such a bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer”).
88
See Gupta, supra note 23, at 14; Governor’s Comm’n., supra note 14, at 23.
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Law Article, §5-101 (f), without a prescription from a licensed
medical practitioner;
• a requirement that the defendant undergo available medical,
psychological, or psychiatric treatment or counseling for drug or
alcohol dependency;
• electronic monitoring;
• periodic reporting to designated supervisory persons;
• committing the defendant to the custody or supervision of a
designated person or organization [including a pretrial services
agency] that agrees to supervise the defendant and assist in
ensuring the defendant’s appearance in court;
• execution of unsecured bonds by the defendant and an
uncompensated surety who (i) has a verifiable and lawful
personal relationship with the defendant, (ii) is acceptable to the
judicial officer, and (iii) is willing to execute such a bond in an
amount specified by the judicial officer.
• any other lawful condition that will help ensure the appearance
of the defendant[]89 or the safety of each alleged victim, other
persons, or the community.90
B. Types of release, order of preference, and applicable legal
standard.
The new rule creates preferences for certain types of release,
generally from least to most onerous. The most preferred type of release
is personal recognizance. Next is an unsecured bond executed by the
defendant alone. Third in line is release on personal recognizance or
unsecured bond executed by the defendant, with special conditions
other than “financial terms” (i.e. terms requiring collateral security or a
guarantee of the defendant’s appearance by a compensated surety).
89

One relatively easy way to increase the likelihood that the defendant will appear in
court is to secure a commitment from a trustworthy family member to remind the
defendant of the court date as it approaches. Research on the use of texts or phone
calls to remind defendants of court dates has begun to show that “simply reminding
defendants of their upcoming court dates has a significant impact on reducing failure
to appear rates.” PUBLIC JUST. INST., REPORT TO THE PRETRIAL RELEASE
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE TASK FORCE TO STUDY THE LAWS AND POLICIES RELATING
TO REPRESENTATION OF INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS BY THE OFFICE OF THE
PUBLIC DEFENDER 8 n.12 (2013) (mentioning several studies from around the
country with comparable findings).
90
MD. R. 4-216.1(d)(2) (A)–(L) & (O).
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Fourth is release on a financial term requiring collateral security.
Finally, the least preferred is release on a financial term that requires a
guarantee of the defendant’s appearance by a compensated surety.
The following table lists the types of release, and provisions
relating to preferences and required findings.
Type of release

Preferences

Personal
recognizance

Most preferred type of
pretrial release.
MD. R. 4216.1(b)(1)(A).
Second-most
preferred type of
pretrial release.
MD. R. 4216.1(b)(1)(A).

Unsecured bond

Personal
recognizance or
unsecured bond
with special
conditions without
financial terms91

91

Standard for
applying (in lieu of
less onerous
alternative(s))

Judicial officer can
use instead of
personal
recognizance “when
necessary.”
MD. R. 4216.1(b)(1)(A).
“If a judicial officer
“Additional
determines that a
conditions should be
defendant should be
imposed on release
released other than on only if the need to
personal recognizance ensure appearance at
or unsecured bond
court proceedings, to
without special
protect the
conditions, the
community, victims,
judicial officer shall
witnesses, or any
impose on the
other person and to
defendant the least
maintain the
onerous condition or
integrity of the
combination of
judicial process is
conditions of release
demonstrated by the
set forth in section (d) circumstances of the
of this Rule that will
individual case.”
reasonably ensure (A)

These are listed supra Part III.A.
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the appearance of the MD. R. 4defendant, and (B) the 216.1(b)(1)(A).
safety of each alleged
victim, other persons,
and the community
and may impose a
financial condition
only in accordance
with section (e) of
this Rule.”
MD. R. 4-216.1(b)(3).
Recognizing that
some conditions
involve financial cost
or other burdens, the
Rule provides that the
judicial officer must
take into account “the
ability of the
defendant to . . .
comply with a special
condition.”
MD. R. 4-216.1(b)(2).

Release on
conditions
including a
“special condition
with financial
terms,” i.e., “the
requirement of

In the same vein, the
Rule also states that
these conditions may
be used to “the extent
appropriate and
capable of
implementation.”
MD. R. 4-216.1(d)(2).
Least preferred type
of release.
MD. R. 4216.1(b)(1)(A).
Even among this
disfavored type of

329
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collateral security
or the guarantee of
the defendant’s
appearance by a
compensated surety
as a condition of the
defendant’s
release.”92

release, a requirement
of a compensated
surety is the most
disfavored.
MD. R. 4216.1(d)(2)(N).

These include:
• execution of a
bond in an amount
specified by the
judicial officer
secured by the
deposit of collateral
security equal in
value to not more
than 10% of the
penalty amount of
the bond or by the
obligation of a
surety, including a
surety insurer,
acceptable to the
judicial officer;
• execution of a
bond secured by the
deposit of collateral
security of a value
in excess of 10% of
the penalty amount
of the bond or by
the obligation of a
surety, including a
surety insurer,
acceptable to the
judicial officer.93
92
93

MD. R. 4-216.1(a)(7).
MD. R. 4-216.1(d)(2)(M)–(N).
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C. Factors a court must consider in determining whether to
release a defendant pending trial and the conditions of any such
release
Rule 4-216.1 requires the court to consider a number of factors.
It provides in pertinent part:
(1) Recommendation of Pretrial Release Services Program
In determining whether a defendant should be released and the
conditions of release, the judicial officer shall give consideration
to the recommendation of any pretrial release services program
that has made a risk assessment of the defendant in accordance
with a validated risk assessment tool and is willing to provide an
acceptable level of supervision over the defendant during the
period of release if so directed by the judicial officer.
(2) Other Factors
In addition to any recommendation made in accordance with
subsection (f)(1) of this Rule, the judicial officer shall consider
the following factors:
(A) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the
nature of the evidence against the defendant, and the potential
sentence upon conviction;
(B) the defendant's prior record of appearance at court
proceedings or flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at
court proceedings;
(C) the defendant's family ties, employment status and history,
financial resources, reputation, character and mental condition,
length of residence in the community, and length of residence in
this State;
(D) any request made under Code, Criminal Procedure Article,
§5-201 (a) for reasonable protections for the safety of an alleged
victim;94
94

The Maryland Rules of Criminal Procedure §5-201(a) provide that
(1) The court or a District Court commissioner shall consider including, as a
condition of pretrial release for a defendant, reasonable protections for the safety of
the alleged victim.
(2) If a victim has requested reasonable protections for safety, the court or a District
Court commissioner shall consider including, as a condition of pretrial release,
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(E) any recommendation of an agency that conducts pretrial
release investigations;
(F) any information presented by the State’s Attorney and any
recommendation of the State's Attorney;
(G) any information presented by the defendant or defendant's
attorney;
(H) the danger of the defendant to an alleged victim, another
person, or the community;
(I) the danger of the defendant to himself or herself; and
(J) any other factor bearing on the risk of a willful failure to
appear and the safety of each alleged victim, another person, or
the community, including all prior convictions95 and any prior
provisions regarding no contact with the alleged victim or the alleged victim’s
premises or place of employment. MD. CODE. ANN. CRIM. PROC. § 5-201(a) (West
2017).
95
That this factor expressly mentions “prior convictions” but not prior arrests or
charges suggests that the court should not consider mere arrests or charges that did
not result in a conviction. See Immanuel v. Comptroller of Maryland, 141 A.3d 181,
193 n.6 (Md. 2016) (explaining that “Maryland has long accepted the doctrine of
expressio (or inclusio) unius est exclusio alterius, or the expression of one thing is
the exclusion of another” (citation omitted)).
This interpretation of the rule is bolstered by two other considerations. First,
most arrests and charges that did not result in convictions can be expunged. See MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-105 (2008 Repl. Vol. & 2017 Supp.). Interpreting to
Rule 4-216.1(f)(2) to permit consideration of such unproven charges would lead to
the absurd result that whether a person is detained or released would depend on
whether he expunged prior charges that did not result in convictions. See generally
Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 775 A.2d 1218, 1224 (Md. 2001) (explaining that
“[t]he words of the rule must also be construed so as not to yield a result which is
unreasonable, absurd, or illogical”).
Second, the mere fact that a defendant has been arrested and charged is not
admissible in sentencing hearings, which are analogous to pretrial release hearings in
that the rules of evidence (other than those regarding the competency of witnesses)
apply in neither proceeding. See MD. R. 5-101(b)(6) & (9). A sentencing judge errs if
he or she “consider[s] a bare list of prior arrests that did not result in convictions.”
Craddock v. State, 494 A.2d 971, 975-76 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (citing Henry v.
State, 328 A.2d 293, 303 (Md. 1974)). In Henry, the Court of Appeals quoted the
following explanation with approval: “While a sentencing judge's inquiry is not
limited by the strict rules of evidence, and evidence of less probative value than is
required for a determination of guilt may be considered, the judge may not consider
evidence which possesses such a low degree of reliability that it raises a substantial
possibility that his judgment may be influenced by inaccurate or false information.
Consideration of such information leads to unwarranted assumption of guilt. For this
reason it has been recognized that when they stand alone, bald accusations of
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adjudications of delinquency that occurred within three years of
the date the defendant is charged as an adult.96
D. Additional limits and requirements applicable to special
conditions with financial terms (i.e., secured bonds or collateral
security)
1. Affordability
“A judicial officer may not impose a special condition of release
with financial terms in form or amount that results in the pretrial
detention of the defendant solely because the defendant is financially
incapable of meeting that condition.”97 In determining what the
defendant can afford, “the judicial officer may consider all resources
available to the defendant from any lawful source.”98 A committee note
following these provisions suggests sources for this information:
Information regarding the defendant’s financial situation may
come from several sources. The Initial Appearance
Questionnaire Form used by District Court commissioners seeks
information from the defendant regarding employment,
occupation, amount and source of income, housing status,
marital status, and number of dependents relying on the
defendant’s income. The criminal and juvenile record checks
made by the commissioner also may reveal relevant
information. Additional information may be available to the
judge at a bail review proceeding from a defense attorney, the
State’s Attorney, and a pretrial services unit.99
In the analogous situation where a court assesses a defendant’s
ability to afford private counsel, the Court of Appeals has cautioned

criminal conduct for which a person either has not been tried or has been tried and
acquitted may not be considered by the sentencing judge.” Henry, 328 A.2d at 303
(internal citations omitted). Similarly, mere arrests and charges, without more, are
not sufficiently reliable to be considered by a judge at a pretrial release hearing.
96
MD. R. 4-216.1(f).
97
MD. R. 4-216.1(e)(1)(A).
98
Id.
99
Id. committee note.
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courts to avoid imputing assets to the defendant that are not necessarily
available to him:
Absent clear evidence of some firm commitment by the family
to devote their resources to appellant's defense, those resources
cannot be imputed to appellant or considered in determining his
indigence because he has no right to or control over them. They
are not his assets.100
If a judge imposes a financial condition that the defendant is
unable to satisfy, Rule 4-216.3 provides a means for the court, on
motion or on its own initiative, to modify or eliminate the financial
condition. Subsection (b) provides:
After a charging document has been filed, the court, on motion
of any party or on its own initiative and after notice and
opportunity for hearing, may revoke an order of pretrial release
or amend it to impose additional or different conditions of
release, subject to the standards and requirements set forth in
Rule 4-216.1. If its decision results in the detention of the
defendant, the court shall state the reasons for its action in
writing or on the record. A judge may alter conditions set by a
commissioner or another judge.101
Prompt review by the court of unaffordable financial conditions
is consistent with Rule 4-216.3’s mandate that the courts monitor the
situations of people held pretrial “to eliminate unnecessary detention”:
In order to eliminate unnecessary detention, the court shall
exercise supervision over the detention of defendants pending
trial. It shall require from the sheriff, warden, or other custodial
officer a weekly report listing each defendant within its
jurisdiction who has been held in custody in excess of seven
days pending preliminary hearing, trial, sentencing, or appeal.
The report shall give the reason for the detention of each
defendant.102

100

Baldwin v. State, 444 A.2d 1058, 1068 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982).
MD. R. 4-216.3(b).
102
MD. R. 4-216.3(c).
101

Saccenti

201]

PRETRIAL RELEASE & DETENTION IN MARYLAND

335

2. Financial terms cannot be used to address dangerousness
“Special conditions of release with financial terms are
appropriate only to ensure the appearance of the defendant and may not
be imposed solely to prevent future criminal conduct during the pretrial
period or to protect the safety of any person or the community . . . .”103
It is important to note that this prohibition extends to conditions
requiring “collateral security or the guarantee of the defendant’s
appearance by a compensated surety as a condition of the defendant’s
release,” but not to unsecured bonds executed by the defendant alone or
by the defendant and by the defendant and an uncompensated surety
who has a verifiable and lawful personal relationship with the defendant
(usually a family member or friend), as such unsecured bonds do not
fall within the definition of a “special condition of release with financial
terms.”104
3. Other restrictions
Special conditions of release with financial terms may not be
imposed “to punish the defendant or to placate public opinion.”105 They
“may not be set by reference to a predetermined schedule of amounts
fixed according to the nature of the charge.”106
4. Required advice
“If the judicial officer requires collateral security, the judicial
officer shall advise the defendant that, if the defendant or an
uncompensated surety posts the required cash or other property,
it will be refunded at the conclusion of the criminal proceedings
if the defendant has not defaulted in the performance of the
conditions of the bond.”107
CONCLUSION

103

MD. R. 4-216.1(e)(1)(B).
MD. R. 4-216.1(a)(7); see also MD. R. 4-216.1(d)(2)(L).
105
MD. R. 4-216.1(e)(1)(B).
106
MD. R. 4-216.1(e)(1)(C).
107
MD. R. 4-216.1(g).
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The 2017 amendments to the court rules governing pretrial
release and detention, if properly implemented, should eliminate the use
of unaffordable bail. In theory, this change should reduce unnecessary
pretrial detention. In practice, it will do so only if our courts faithfully
adhere to the procedural protections that exist to ensure that “liberty is
the norm, and detention prior to trial . . . is the carefully limited
exception.”108

108

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).

